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In this article I inquire into the possibility of citizenship ‘after orientalism’ 
by examining Chinese academics’ writings on internal migrants in China. 
The popular narratives of migrants represent them as ‘peasant workers in 
need of becoming urban citizens’. These representations are based on 
understanding of citizenship as necessarily urban and modern, which is 
reminiscent of Weber’s theory of citizenship, and is based on mechanisms 
of ‘internal orientalism’. I argue that contrary to the popular understanding 
of ‘post-oriental’ as ‘resistance to the West’, it is the process of the 
boundary-transgression between rural and urban, rather than the non-
Western ideas of citizenship, that opens space for citizenship ‘after 
orientalism’ in China. This process of boundary-transgression can be 
mapped through new practices of naming and narrative-setting in the 
literature on internal migrants, which emphasise subjective character of 
group boundaries and appeal for recognition of urban and migrant identities. 
It is through these instances of boundary-transgression between urban and 
rural that orientalism embedded in the Chinese notion of citizenship is 
challenged. 
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Citizenship has long been understood as regime particular to ‘Western’2 nation-states 
and only transplanted to non-’Western’ cultures in the process of colonisation. However, 
the first decade of the 21st century brought forward criticism of such a nation-state-
bound and Euro-centric view of citizenship. The reformulation of citizenship beyond the 
Marshallian triad of civil, political and social rights, towards recognition of rights along 
the lines of de-nationalisation (Isin and Wood, 1999: vii) marks this trend. The 
dominant focus on citizenship as a status or practice was challenged as insufficient and 
a new framework of ‘acts of citizenship’ was proposed to account for those acts of 
agents-citizens, which go beyond the legal status or already defined practices of 
citizenship (Isin and Nielsen, 2008: 1-2). Concomitantly, there has been a push towards 
decentralisation of citizenship studies from its Euro-centric perspective. The calls for 
inclusion of ‘alternative’ theories of citizenship from non-’Western’ viewpoints were to 
account for ‘subaltern’ voices, which have been marginalised by the processes of 
colonisation in the non-’Western’ world and ensuing orientalisation of these cultures in 
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‘Western’ academia (Delanty, 2009: 129, Isin and Wood, 1999: 5-6). There has been a 
growing interest in ‘alternative’ expressions of citizenship in citizenship studies. 
However, if we are to turn to those alternative expressions of citizenship in the 
non-’Western’ world, we first need to ask how we divorce them from the orientalised 
East-West binary divide? How do we describe the ‘alternative’ forms of citizenship if 
the very name and definition of citizenship is embedded in European experience? In this 
light, which developments in Chinese academia can be viewed as breaking away from 
the influence of orientalism? In this article I will show that conceptualisation of 
citizenship, which challenges orientalism, does not necessarily have to be ‘alternative’. I 
will argue that attempts at distinguishing traces of thought which are ‘Western’ from 
those which are ‘indigenous’ in order to account for something ‘original’ would most 
likely lead to a repetition of the binary divisions introduced by orientalism. Nowadays it 
is almost impossible to divorce the ways in which Chinese academics build theories 
from ‘Western’ influences. The ‘Western’ influences are deeply ingrained in China 
through discourses such as modernisation and nationalism, which even if they were 
remoulded in a Chinese way, originated in the West (Chen, 1995: 4, Delanty, 2009: 
256-258). Therefore, while the search for alternative expressions of citizenship stems 
from a rejection of orientalised and West-centred understandings of citizenship, there is 
a danger of re-enacting of the orientalised East-West binary instead of problematizing it. 
In this paper I will argue that ‘challenging orientalism’, when this ‘challenging’ 
takes form of emancipation from the West, only leads to a repetition of essentialised and 
nationalised understanding of citizenship. Yet, if one understands ‘challenging 
orientalism’ in a wider sense, as an instance of boundary-transgression (crossing, 
questioning, challenging) between migrants and a host community, between citizens and 
non-citizens, between Self and Other, and finally between East and West, then indeed 
the search for citizenship ‘after orientalism’ in the Chinese academia can gain a new 
perspective. By analysing Chinese academic discussions around the question of internal 
migrants’ citizenship in China, I will demonstrate that in Chinese academia, the 
instances of challenging orientalism are located in such practices of boundary-
transgression.   
In this paper, I will first discuss what can be understood as ‘orientalism’ and 
‘post-orientalism’. Next, I will analyse the context behind the citizenship regime in 
China, especially with regard to internal migrants in China. I will then discuss how 
‘Western’ and ‘indigenous’ concepts of citizenship have been understood and employed 
in Chinese academia. I will show why the search for ‘alternative’ concepts of 
citizenship does not necessarily lead to citizenship ‘after orientalism’. In the final part I 
will show that it is rather through questioning of the dominant language and narratives 
representing migrants that Chinese scholars transgress the boundary between rural and 
urban and redeem migrants as ‘citizens’. I will argue that these instances of boundary-
transgression also challenge the East-West essentialism by questioning what it means to 
be a ‘citizen’ and conclude that it is these moments of boundary-transgression that can 
be understood as citizenship ‘after orientalism’.  
 
Orientalism, China and the theories of citizenship in ‘Western’ academia 
In the field of citizenship studies, the decentralising trend, away from the focus on 
‘Western’ experience, stems from the post-colonial critique of orientalism. One of the 
main meanings of orientalism, a term originally used by Edward Said, was ‘a way of 
coming to terms with the Orient that […] helped to define Europe (or the West) as its 
contrasting image’ (Said, 1978: 1-2). Since Said’s publication, the theory of Orientalism 
has been extended to account for a wider experience than just the encounter between the 
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Middle East and Western Europe. One of such extensions of the original theory was its 
application to the China-West relations. Ho-fung Hung, for instance, looks at the power 
politics behind various orientalised representations of China in the West from the 17th to 
19th century: those which idealised China, and vilified it. He points out that those 
representations used the narrative of hierarchical linear progress, where China was 
portrayed as uniform, timeless and essentialised in contrast to diverse and complex 
West. This portrayal served the political agendas of actors such as Jesuits and Jansenits 
in France, French monarch as well as the 19th century German state (Hung, 2003).  
While the above understanding of the theory of Orientalism focuses on the East-
West relationship, there is also another way of looking at how the discourse of 
orientalism is being redistributed through mechanisms of modernity. For instance, 
Maifair Yang (2011) shows how Western orientalist discourse was absorbed in China 
with disastrous effects on local religiosities. She calls the process of appropriation of 
Western theories by Chinese elites and official classes ‘colonization of consciousness’ 
and explains how in result Chinese started viewing themselves through the lenses of 
Western orientalism, seeing anything non-modern as ‘backward’ and ‘shameful’ (Yang, 
2011: 7,13). 
 This understanding, which emphasises the redeployment of orientalist discourse 
within the state, is also used in the notion of ‘internal orientalism’. ‘Internal orientalism’ 
is a situation when one group within the state creates its own image and secures its 
dominant position through representation of another group as its ‘Other’. In China there 
are many groups who played the role of orientalised ‘Others’ within the state; for 
instance minorities and women (see Schein, 1997 and Gladney, 2004). In this paper I 
will discuss how orientalised representations of internal migrants as ‘backward peasants’ 
has helped in establishing of the identity of the modern, urban ‘Self’. 
An example of how this mechanism of ‘internal orientalism’ is bound to the 
forces of modernity is the striking similarity between the understanding of citizenship in 
contemporary China and Max Weber’s description of citizenship as necessarily urban 
(and Occidental). As Mayfair Yang (2011: 8) fairly pointed out, there is little research, 
which looks at the microcosmos of influences of orientalism within the postcolonial 
states. Other than the discussions on the ‘alternative modernities’ in Asia (see Delanty, 
2009: 256-258), there has been little research conducted on the internal struggle which 
has accompanied the incorporation of Western theories by Chinese elites and officials in 
China. Such focus can help us understand how citizenship in China is conditioned by 
internal redeployment of orientalist strategies. One of such theories is the understanding 
of citizenship which was consolidated in Max Weber’s theory, and which is based on 
mechanisms of ‘internal orientalisation’ of the rural population. In China, through 
various processes (that I will discuss in the next section) a remarkably similar 
understanding of citizenship endures.  
The main reason why Weber’s theory of citizenship is usually viewed as 
orientalist is its insistence that citizenship could not be conceived of outside of the city, 
and more specifically – Occidental city (Weber, 1951: 14, Weber, 1963: 1226 - 1228, 
1233). Weber explains that it is so, because the city gives space for formation of 
solidarities based not on kinship, but on spontaneous association between people who 
are not related by links of blood (Weber, 1951: 13). This theory of necessitating the 
city-membership in order to be recognised as a citizen was criticised as Euro-centric 
because it was modelled after an ideal of the Greek polis (Isin, 2002: 11, 18-21) and it 
stipulated that citizenship should be automatically equated with ‘legal status’. Such 
interpretation ignored those expressions of citizenship in Western and non-Western 
locations, which were not necessarily institutionalised (Isin and Wood, 1999: 5). 
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However, the orientalism of this theory also served as a political instrument, as it was 
bound to a specific power-politics in the beginning of 20th century, which I will explain 
in the next paragraph. 
The juxtaposing urbanite-citizen with peasant-non-citizen, which Weber 
introduces in his theory is neither a solitary attempt nor detached from the general spirit 
of his era. As Eugen Weber explains (1976: 3) that the ‘internal orientalisation’ of 
peasants (and impoverished migrants to the city) as ‘savages’ was rather commonplace 
in modernising and industrialising 19th century France. Therefore, as what Max Weber 
solidified into a ‘scientific’ theory was in fact a commonplace attitude towards peasants 
as non-citizens in modernizing Western Europe, the theory cannot be separated from the 
powerful discourses of modernity and industrialisation. More so, Max Weber’s 
understanding of citizenship as urban and Occidental was subordinated to the concrete 
political aims of the state (in this case – German state). Ho-feng Hung explains that at 
the beginning of the 20th century knowledge of the East was pervaded by discourses of 
science, rationality and racism, which were used to explain the social changes in Europe 
and to justify the superiority of Western civilisation (Hung, 2003: 272). The portrayal of 
China as backward (present in the late writing of philosophers such as James Legge and 
J.J.M. de Groot) was greatly influenced by the scholarship of Max Muller, whose 
research was funded by the German government and was to serve building of the 
unified, ethnic German state. As Hung argues, these writings were the main inspiration 
behind Weber’s critique of Chinese religion and also a main foundation for his 
argument why rationality and capitalism were unique to Occidental culture (Hung, 2003: 
267, 271). As I will present further in this paper, this ‘Weberian’ understanding of 
citizenship as non-rural has become a cornerstone of the contemporary regime of 
citizenship in China. Although Max Weber is not specifically cited in Chinese 
discussions on citizenship, the way citizenship is understood in contemporary China is 
remarkably reminiscent of the way it was understood in Europe during the prominence 
of his theory.  
If the above discussions related to the way orientalism has been understood and 
redeployed, what developments can be interpreted as ‘challenging orientalism’? Nevzat 
Soguk defines the ‘post-oriental’ subject as someone who resists ‘Western’ domination 
(Soguk, 1993: 364). Such popular understanding of ‘post-oriental’ as ‘resistance to the 
West’ is the one which I wish to problematise, because it re-produces the essentialised 
category of the ‘Self’. Instead, I intend to illustrate that in order to resist the 
‘internalised orientalism’, the scholarship must be seated in the instances of boundary-
transgression. Consequently, in order to show the multiple understandings of 
orientalism (as ‘internal orientalism’, as ‘occidentalism’ and as ‘orientalist 
technologies’), I prefer to refer to those attempts in scholarly works I will discuss here 
as ‘challenging orientalism’ or ‘after orientalism’, rather than ‘post-oriental’. 
 
Rural-to-urban migrants in China and the question of citizenship 
Before I proceed with the discussion on citizenship as a discourse in China, the 
historical background on the relationship between citizenship regime, the urban/rural 
divide and internal migration is needed. The citizenship regime in China has been an 
on-going product of a hybridisation of domestic and foreign influences. The traditional 
relationship between city and countryside in pre-modern Qing empire has been often 
portrayed as based on balanced economic and cultural exchanges between rural and 
urban, where rural life and identities were not seen as inferior, but rather ideal. Many 
rural migrants to the cities would return to villages to cultivate land or teach. Such 
equilibrium shifted after the first Opium War in 1840, which resulted in the rapid 
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growth of coastal cities, and brought about crime, prostitution, opium addiction and 
alienation of Chinese inhabitants from public spaces by the colonial overlords. After 
taking power over in 1949, the Communists wanted to renounce anything that they 
associated with pre-modern ‘feudalism’ or ‘bourgeois’ class (urban merchants) in the 
Republican Era and with Western colonialism (Whyte and Parish, 1984: 10-16).  
In this new regime, the urbanities were to receive secure employment, education 
and food ratios. In order to realise this modernisation and urbanisation dream and secure 
inflow of resources to the cities to satisfy the urbanities, the government introduced a 
hereditary system of hukou (household registration number) policy. The hukou system 
emulated the internal passport propiska system in the Soviet Union dividing citizens 
into rural and urban residents. In result the underprivileged workforce was to be 
contained and immobilised in the countryside in the way which, as Dorothy Solinger 
argues, reminded the process of ‘internal colonisation’ (Solinger, 1999: 27). After the 
economic reforms were initiated in 1978 the hukou system has been gradually relaxed. 
Today the hukou system still denies social rights to rural hukou holders, such as free 
medical care, employment benefits or free education for migrants’ children, especially 
in the biggest cities (Solinger, 1999: 4, Hsu, 2009: 130-131).  
Although throughout both Empire (from the 12th century) and the Republican 
period there were no strict restrictions as such of population movement, the system of 
registration (for tax purposes and neighbourhood patrols) had existed in China during 
Imperial times (Solinger, 1999: 28-29). Yet, it had never (at least in China) led to a 
wedge between countryside and cities, that would elevate urbanities as privileged 
citizens (Solinger, 1999: 32). Only during the Republican era, in cities like Shanghai, 
did a bourgeois class begin to emerge, for which the notion of shimin (urban citizen) 
was used for the first time. However, Solinger argues that the de facto division of 
Chinese society into two classes, rural and urban, was unprecedented in China and was 
only introduced by the hukou system in the 1950s (Solinger, 1999:27). Yet, while 
Solinger places blame for the urban-centred idea of citizenship in China solely on the 
hukou system, I will later illustrate that by looking at the academic discussions on 
citizenship in China, one may learn that citizenship in China should rather be 
understood through wider discourses at play. 
The Soviet version of Marxism introduced and strengthened many of the 
Western discourses in China; most visibly, that of the teleological idea of history and of 
linear progress (Chen, 1995: 4). Subsequently, after the ‘opening to the world reforms’ 
some new narratives, other than Communism, came to the fore. The narratives of 
development and progress became even more pronounced and running parallel was the 
process of further downgrading of peasant identities as anti-modern and not fitting with 
the ‘powerful progressive nationalist historical narrative’ (Yang, 2011: 5, 6). Over the 
past three decades, the inequality of the system came to be even more tangibly 
experienced by those who migrated to Chinese cities. Nowadays, the migrants (in 
Chinese most commonly referred to as ‘peasant workers’ - nongmingong) amount to 
about 200 million people (Tunon, 2006: 5, Amnesty International, 2007). With 
migration, the process of marginalisation of the peasantry did not only not disappear, 
but the capitalist and market-orientated mind-set of urbanities enhanced the 
discrimination (Solinger, 1999: 9). Yet, as migrations exposed the huge inequalities that 
the hukou system caused, they also renewed the academic discussion on citizenship in 
China. 
Today, although the hukou legislation still remains unchanged in most Chinese 
cities, there have been some developments, which to an extent mitigate the negative 
impact of the hukou system. For instance, as part of the membership requirements for 
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China’s accession to the WTO, factories in China were put under a legal obligation to 
guarantee basic benefits for all workers, including migrants, such as pension funds, 
medical insurance and workplace accident insurance. However, this has been resisted by 
the factory owners and scarcely implemented (Cai, 2008: 68). Additionally, in 2008 the 
government issued a new ‘Contract Labour Law’, which introduced packages of rights 
and benefits for all workers. Yet, as Cai noted (2008: 68), the extension of some of the 
rights to migrant workers changed little in the daily lives of migrants, as the market 
pressure for cheap labour means that migrants’ income remains low, which is the main 
reason for the poor economic situation of migrants. Chen Yingfang also emphasised that 
although central government strives to reform the hukou system, this process is hindered 
by the local governments, who oppose such transformation as the existence of the hukou 
system better serves their interests (Chen, 2005: 121). However, the extent to which 
these ‘interests’ are determined in the first place by the pressures for meeting 
development targets imposed by the central government remains an open question. 
This focus on migrants’ lack of substantive citizenship, which was initiated by 
Solinger, was popularised extensively in the discussion on migrant citizenship within 
and outside of China. For instance, following Solinger, Chen Yingfang employs the idea 
of migrants as ‘non-citizens’, because of their restricted citizenship rights in the city 
(Chen, 2005: 121). The interest in abolishment of the hukou system is now propagated 
far beyond academia. There are many voices wishing for abolishment of the hukou 
system, such as the calls of editors of some newspapers in China (DaHeWang-DaHeBao, 
2010) or some international organisations and NGOs (Amnesty International, 2007, 
Wang, 2008). The sprouting of NGOs in China, and the involvement of different agents 
in the process of negotiation of migrants’ citizenship increased pressures to abolish the 
hukou system altogether. The increasing interest of international bodies and Chinese and 
foreign media has publicised migrants’ situation and has reshaped attitudes towards 
them. The attitude of the urban population has also become more inviting and 
sympathetic towards migrants (personal communication with the head of migrant-
orientated student association in Zhejiang University on 24 September 2011 and with a 
professor working on migrants issues from Zhejiang University on 18 November 2011).  
Although many of Solinger’s findings are still valid, there is certain limitation to 
her argument. While discussing migrants’ citizenship, Solinger and many who followed 
in her footsteps, put emphasis on substantive rights of citizenship. This overlooks other 
understandings of citizenship, which, if acknowledged, could show migrants not as 
victims, but as active agents, constituting themselves as citizens (such as those 
propagated by NGOs in China). There is little engagement with the theories of 
citizenship beyond the focus on hukou and little questioning of the discourses, other 
than hukou, which condition the current citizenship regime in China. The hukou system, 
and with it the question of substantive rights, remains the core interest of the Chinese 
and ‘Western’ researchers. However, as it will be shown in the last part of this paper, 
only by going beyond the narrative of hukou and by accounting for other factors behind 
the citizenship regime in China can the rift between rural and urban population be 
challenged. 
 
The conceptualisation of citizenship in Chinese academia  
In this section I will present how ‘Western’ and Chinese ideas of citizenship have been 
incorporated into the process of Chinese state-building. I will show how the notions of 
rural and urban were played out in the discourse of citizenship in the way, which is 
reminiscent of Weberian understanding of citizenship. 
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‘Western’ theories of citizenship were first adapted in Chinese context in the 
Republican period (1912 - 1949). The Chinese terms for ‘citizen’ started emerging in 
parallel to the implementation of the modernisation project in China and they were 
hybrids of ‘Western’ and ‘indigenous’ influences (Zarrow, 1997: 5). Contemporarily 
there are several Chinese words, which could be translated as ‘citizens’, most important 
of which are gongmin (public people), shimin (city people) and guomin (people of the 
state)3. All the above terms for ‘citizen’ share the second character of min, which means 
‘the people’ (who are both ruled and who sanction the ruler’s authority). Therefore, the 
first concept that could actually be understood as a concept of ‘citizenship’ was the pre-
modern Confucian term of minben (‘people as the basis’), which used the above 
explained meaning of ‘min’ (Harris, 2002:187). However, since Confucianism holds 
that the relationship between state and society is a ‘harmonious pact’ (minyue), the 
contract between society and the state was unthought-of (Zarrow, 1997:13). Chih-Yu 
Shih further argues that the relationship between emperor and the people was compared 
to the relationship between father and son and the state itself was portrayed as a form of 
extended family (Shih, 2002; 233).This Confucian representation of state-society 
relations is still present in China, with a striking example of the current usage of 
‘harmony’ (hexie) rhetoric in the Chinese public space and propaganda. Yet, it is this 
strategy of stressing unity and ‘harmony’ that has long helped to marginalise ‘the 
internal Other’ in order to strengthen the project of building a unified, modern nation-
state (Barabantseva, 2011: 4-5). This does not only relate to ethnic and religious 
minorities, but also concerns the way peasants and consequently, internal migrants, have 
been portrayed in the discourse on citizenship. 
This tension between urban and rural is encapsulated in the very name for 
‘citizen’ in Chinese language. Although gongmin (public people) is a core of the notion 
for citizenship (gongminquan), indeed a word most commonly used in China to depict 
‘citizen’ is shimin (urban citizen). Shimin originated in the Republican period to reflect 
the city associations’ attempts at self-governance in a relative autonomy from the state 
(Harris, 2002: 188). In this sense it directly incorporated the Weberian understanding of 
citizen, although there are arguments that the urban merchant class in the late Qing and 
Republican Era had never attained similar autonomy to that of their counterparts in 
Western European cities (Yujiro, 1997:137). In contemporary China, however, the 
notion of shimin is somewhat ambiguous. On one hand it is used to depict ‘citizen’, but 
on the other hand it is also popularly understood as an administrative term meaning ‘an 
urban-hukou-holder living in a city’ (as it did during the Maoist period) (Harris, 2002: 
188, Chen, 2008: 120). However, there is certain politics of exclusion present in both, 
even the latter, more ‘casual’ usage of the notion of shimin.  
This exclusionary character of shimin is reflected in the notion of shiminhua 
(‘becoming a citizen’ or ‘turning/being turned into citizen’). In Chinese academic texts, 
the transformation from rural to urban, as in the culture, the identity, the sense of 
belonging, but also, more technically, as an instance of attaining urban citizenship rights, 
is generally called shiminhua (eg. Cai, 2008). Shiminhua is often used interchangeably 
with the most common translation for ‘citizenship’ (gongminquan or shiminquan) to 
simply depict a state of possessing citizenship rights (Wang, 2009: 126). To illustrate 
the pervasiveness of understanding citizenship as urban privilege, the politics behind the 
notions of gongminquan/shiminquan is illustrative. Shiminquan/gongminquan literally 
means ‘citizenship rights’ and it is different from the translation for citizenship status- 
gongmin zige (or shimin zige). Chen Yingfang argues that gongmin zige/shimin zige is a 
more inclusive term than gongminquan/shiminquan (Chen, 2005: 120). For instance, 
Ren Lixin understands the 45th article of the Chinese constitution as endowing all 
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Chinese citizens (gongmin), including migrants, with ‘citizenship status’ (gongmin zige) 
(Ren, 2010: 63). The notion of gongminquan/shiminquan, on the other hand, although 
originally it was simply a translation of the English word ‘citizenship’, it came to 
represent the privileged state of those, who ‘possess urban hukou endowing them with 
social rights of citizenship and a privileged identity of urban citizens’ (Chen, 2005: 120). 
The term shimin is therefore a de facto marker of the boundary between those who 
‘have citizenship rights’ and those who do not, and between those who deserve to be 
identified as ‘citizens’ and those who do not. It can be said that in contemporary China, 
the exclusionary and orientalised Weberian understanding of citizen indeed pertains to 
those who are de facto endowed with citizenship rights, status and identity. 
 
Why ‘indigenous’ theories do not challenge orientalism – instrumental application 
of ‘Western’ and Chinese theories  
So far, I have presented the process of the incorporation of ‘Western’ concepts of 
citizenship as theory and praxis and their hybridisation with Chinese philosophical 
foundations. In order to better understand why looking for ‘alternative’ 
conceptualisations of citizenship in Chinese academia is not tantamount to citizenship 
‘after orientalism’, I will now demonstrate how both ‘Western’ and Chinese influences 
are played out in Chinese academic texts in the wider context of political struggle.  
While both ‘Western’ and ‘indigenous’ Chinese theories have served as a 
foundations for contemporary understandings of citizenship, it is ‘Western’ theories that 
dominate Chinese scholarship on citizenship. Chinese academics have been borrowing 
‘Western’ (mostly positivist) theories of citizenship, migration, urbanisation and 
integration because incorporation of ‘Western’ theories is often seen as a necessary 
hallmark of emphasising their ‘scientific’, and therefore true, accurate and unarguable 
quality. This belief in ‘science’ is reflected in a widespread application of positivist 
methodology in Chinese academia (large-scale statistical study, discourses of linear 
progress, quantitative over qualitative methods of research and usage of ’scientific’ 
theories and vocabulary) (eg. Ren, 2010, Mao and Wang, 2006, Mao, 2009)4. Such 
methodology reflects belief in science and linear progress, and resonates with dominant 
discourses in China. For instance, in order to convince the readership that the equal 
citizenship rights between migrant and urban-hukou-holding workers are essential 
attributes of a modern and progressive nation-state, Ren Lixin (2010) evokes Marshall’s 
theory of citizenship, which presents the development of citizenship rights in an 
evolutionary manner from civil, to political and social rights. He explains that 
Marshall’s theory is accurate because it describes a ‘natural process’ of development of 
rights and something that has already turned into ‘common knowledge’ (Ren, 2010: 63).  
On the other hand, while the incorporation of Chinese theories remains popular, 
it seems to be done more ad hoc (rather than systematically) and is done instrumentally. 
Chinese theories are evoked to justify the uniqueness of the situation of migrants in 
China (and more generally – of citizens, civil society and society-state relations in 
China) by presenting it as ‘Chinese exceptionalism’ which ‘cannot be simply explained 
by Western theories’. Such rhetoric is vividly reminiscent of European academia’s 
usage of orientalist practices for state-building purposes, as discussed earlier in this 
paper. Indeed, while many have looked at orientalism as a political instrument of 
Western countries, some scholars have pointed out how orientalism has been re-
appropriated within China in the same way as it has been used in the West – to 
distinguish oneself from the Other (in this case Occident, rather than the Orient) for 
political purposes.  
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Xiaomei Chen proposed (1995: 4-5) that such instances of re-appropriation of 
orientalism within the state and academic discourse in China should be called 
‘Occidentalism’.  She argues that it is impossible to divorce Western influence from 
what is ‘authentically Chinese’ because what is ‘authentically Chinese’ ‘has already 
been “contaminated” and even constructed by cultural and inter-cultural appropriations 
that belong to the whole of Chinese-Western relationships’ (Chen, 1995: 4). In a current 
trend-review of popular and academic publications on China, William A. Callahan 
points out that China is being increasingly represented as predestined to follow its own 
‘unique’ way to modernity (2012a). Callahan argues that some authors both in China 
(eg. Pan Wei, 2009 and Mingfu Liu, 2010 quoted in Callahan, 2012a) and in the West 
(eg. Martin Jacque, 2009 and David Kang, 2007, quoted in Callahan, 2012a) support the 
‘Chinese exceptionalism’ argument with selective readings of history and use 
essentialised categories of China and the West to convey their arguments. He points out 
that their scholarship is interestingly close to the Chinese government’s official 
propaganda, and remains more of a political tool than a solid piece of research 
(Callahan, 2012a: 35-51). Similarly, Mayfair Young also argues that there is a Chinese 
version of orientalism and that too little attention has been paid to how orientalism has 
been re-appropriated in China (Yang, 2011: 8).  
Here, I will extend this existing scholarship on Chinese re-appropriation of 
orientalism discourse by looking at how it is played out in the context of citizenship. 
Here ‘Chinese exceptionalism’ is not only used to suit dominant political discourse and 
achieve certain political goals in support of the state’s propaganda. It is also employed 
to carve out space for certain social and political goals and agendas, which only 
seemingly applaud state propaganda. It often seems that Chinese academics somehow 
uncritically reproduce state’s discourses across their texts. However, as discussed earlier, 
in relation to state-society model of relations in China, the mechanisms of resistance in 
the contemporary academic writings in China are not necessarily manifested in an open 
confrontation with the state-set discourse, but remain more conciliatory. While evoking 
‘harmonious society’ (hexie shehui) as an ultimate aim (in line with the Party’s 
propaganda aim), academics also use the word ‘harmonious’ as a justification of their 
critical stance towards the current system denying migrants social rights. Cai Jingcheng 
(2008), for instance, says that the ‘process of turning migrants into (urban) citizens 
(shiminhua) promotes urban harmony’, by which he means that only if migrants attain 
citizenship rights which are granted to urban hukou holders, can there be a truly 
‘harmonious society’.  
Similarly, Mao Dan’s incorporation of the neo-Confucian rhetoric that the state-
society relationship in China is modelled after the father-son relationship seems to be 
only superficially subscribing to the government’s propaganda. He compares different 
patterns of state- civil society relationships to different types of father-son relationships 
(‘if father is authoritarian, son becomes handicapped’; ‘if father is weak, son becomes 
unrestrained’ etc.). He concludes that the model of ‘friendly relationship’ between 
father and son (fuzipengyouxing) is the best, as it allows greater freedom in moulding 
the type of son (citizen) which is the most desirable for the society.  Therefore, he 
makes a wishful recommendation for the current state-society relationship not to remain 
an authoritarian father-handicapped son model but to be transformed into the 
relationship of friendship (Mao, 2010: 27-28). Through this usage of neo-Confucian 
analogy Mao indeed writes himself into the state-set and acceptable discourse, but he 
does it to express his reservations about the current state-society arrangement. Callahan 
(2012b) pointed out a similar process occurring among intellectuals-artists in Shanghai, 
when they willingly participate in the dominant state discourse, yet they manipulate this 
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discourse in order to reach their own goals of claiming public space for the ‘new civil 
society’. 
All in all, it seems that looking at the authors’ usage of Chinese theories does not 
necessarily challenge orientalism. What emerges from the intermingling of ‘Western’ 
and Chinese theories in Chinese texts is rather characteristic of political power struggles 
whereby both strands of theories are used in order to justify academic arguments, and 
support appeals for change, but also to support state propaganda. It rather seems that the 
usage of Chinese theories and philosophical concepts leads to orientalised and 
essentialised understandings of the Self, as it better suits the state-led processes and 
discourses, especially nationalism.  
 
Migrants in the citizenship narratives in Chinese academia – transgressing the 
boundary? 
However, what is also emerging in these academic texts are attempts to transgress the 
urban/rural divide. These moments of questioning are often triggered by the category of 
migrants, which by appearing as neither rural nor urban compels academics to rethink 
the rural/urban divide and the corresponding understanding of citizenship. This 
changing vocabulary and attitudes, I argue, more than the non-Western ideas of 
citizenship make citizenship ‘after orientalism’ possible. 
Chinese rural migrants who have been the main engine behind the rapid 
urbanisation process have long been portrayed as outsiders and criminals, or at best as a 
backward (under)class in the media and urban space (culminating in practices such as 
walling migrant communities in Beijing (He, 2010)). As they have been treated 
similarly to peasants, as non-urban, they have also become the Other against whom the 
image of the modern, urban, middle class citizenry has been created. In academia, 
similarly to wider representations, the vocabulary has long been pervaded with the 
narratives of migrants-criminal, migrants-peasants or at best migrants-victims, even if 
such portrayal is evoked to explain the need for change in the current situation of 
migrants in China. It is often in this context that the discussion on migrants’ citizenship 
is being conveyed. Cai Jingcheng, for instance, lists the ‘inferiority complex’ and 
criminal behaviours among migrants as those aspects, which can be best tackled by ‘the 
transformation [of migrants] into (urban) citizens’ (shiminhua) (Cai, 2008: 69-70). By 
‘turning [migrants] into citizens’ Cai means a thorough process of transformation of 
migrants’ very identities and ways of life:  
While treating migrants kindly and helping them to shake off their poverty, the 
society should also help migrants to undergo a gradual process of ‘becoming (urban) 
citizens’ (shiminhua); to allow them to participate in the fruits of industrialisation 
and urbanisation processes (…). The vigorous progress of urbanisation advances the 
process of ‘turning migrants (nongmingong) into citizens’ (shiminhua). (…) The 
process of urbanisation is also the process which involves the transformation of rural 
identities into (urban) citizens’ identities; [this process of ‘turning into (urban) 
citizens’ involves following changes:] employment in the non-rural sector, 
modernisation of lifestyle, urbanisation of accommodation and production [and] the 
socialisation into the welfare benefits system.(…) Therefore, progress of 
marketization of agriculture, urbanisation and turning migrants into (urban) citizens 
is the only way towards a realisation of the humanitarian [aim] of the development 
of the harmonious society (Cai, 2008: 70). 
In the majority of narratives the process of ‘becoming citizens’ (shiminhua) is 
understood as the migrants’ ultimate need and aim. The majority of academics use this 
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kind of migrant-victim narrative to make requests for migrants’ ‘rightful access to social 
benefits’, ‘education rights for their children’ ‘respect for physical labour’ etc. (Fan and 
Mao, 2008, Cai, 2008: 69, Chen, 2005: 121). However, this process also means refusal, 
rather than acceptance, of the pre-existing (rural) identities of migrants. In this dominant 
narrative the process of ‘becoming (urban) citizen’ is the process of replacement of rural 
identities with one of ‘a better kind’; modern and urban. Rural is not only portrayed as 
the inferior; rural migrant is an unfortunate victim of the underdevelopment of the 
countryside, and an answer to her/his problems is to ‘become (like) an urban citizen’. 
In popular imagination, the disparity between the backward rural and modern 
urban is rarely challenged. However, there is limited questioning of this boundary 
taking place in the academia. This questioning takes form of the twin processes of 
naming and narrative-setting, which re-draft and problematize group boundaries. 
The first one, naming, is the way the migrants have been portrayed through the 
use of particular names and definitions. The other process is the one related to the 
narratives through which migrants have been represented, and which remain closely 
intertwined with the labelling process. I will argue that the shift from the vocabulary 
and narratives which represent migrants as passive victims to those recognising 
migrants’ identities and problematising current conceptualisation of citizenship in China 
are also those which challenge its internal orientalism.  
 
Questioning the boundary through new practices of naming; from xinshimin to 
deconstruction 
Some academics call migrants ‘new urban citizens’ (xinshimin) (eg. Mao, 2008: 52), 
which although it does not question the boundary, it attempts to re-draft the position of 
migrants in the popular imagination. This attempt is also innovative, as Mao Dan does 
not imply that migrants have to swap their hukou to an urban one to be worthy of the 
label of ‘urban citizens’, but rather that the very fact of them living and working in the 
city is already deserving of the new label. Although there is no serious deconstruction of 
the category of migrants as a group, by redefining migrants as ‘new citizens’ he shifts 
the boundary between citizens and non-citizens and breaks away with the dominant 
hukou narrative. These instances of a more inclusionary vocabulary are worthy of 
attention as there is still little questioning as to why all migrants are instantly perceived 
as a unified group with certain indispensable characteristics.  
This representation of migrants as ‘a unified group’ is encapsulated in the label 
of ‘peasant workers’ (nongmingong). Chen Yingfang claims that the popularisation of 
the label of ‘peasant workers’, resulted in the prejudiced attitudes towards migrants as 
transient, uprooted ‘third group’, belonging to neither rural, nor urban (Chen, 2005: 
130). Chen criticises the temporality embedded in the notions of nongmingong and 
‘floating population’ (liudongrenkou) not necessarily because migrants indeed do not 
return to their native place in the countryside, but rather because such labelling outright 
denies the right for migrants to permanently associate with the city. Such a situation is 
even more dramatic, since the label of ‘peasant workers’ is hereditary and passed down 
to children, even if they grow up in the cities and might never set foot in the native 
place of their parents (Chen, 2005: 131). He proposes to move beyond the rhetoric of 
rights to see that migrants’ situation also resides in aspects other than just their 
economic situation or formal hukou status, but that it also extends to elusive realms of 
language and perception (Chen, 2005: 132).  
The process of re-naming, and more so, the questioning of the mechanisms 
behind this process are the steps towards re-drafting and problematizing of group 
boundaries. Some academics deconstruct the understanding of ‘migrants’ as a group. 
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Wang Xiaozhang, following Chen’s critique of nongmingong and drawing on Benedict 
Anderson’s idea of ‘imagined community’, concludes that the notion of ‘peasant 
workers’ (nongmingong) depicts a group, which came to life as an imagined construct in 
popular consciousness, and does not necessarily correspond with the ‘real’ identities and 
problems of migrants (Wang, 2009: 129). Using Wittgenstein’s theory of ‘family 
resemblance’ he argues that nongmingong is just a category reflecting certain relations 
between exclusionary and recognition practices, rather than a fixed characteristic which 
can be applied to determine who is/is not a nongmingong (just like the resemblance 
between the members of a family is rather elusive and cannot be pinpointed) (Wang, 
2009: 135). As such, he argues that ‘there is a need [in China] to rethink anew the 
sociological conceptualisation of citizenship, to understand afresh who migrants are as a 
group; what they strive for and how they attain citizenship (gongminquan)’ (Wang, 
2009:133). 
The new practices of naming range from including migrants into urban citizenry 
by calling them ‘new urban citizens’, criticising popular naming practices, especially 
the label of nongmingong as well as questioning the social imaginary of migrants as a 
unified group with indispensable characteristics. This process of re-naming is 
intertwined with the critique of the dominant narratives on migrants’ citizenship. 
 
Questioning the boundary through change in narratives 
Wang Xiaozhang argues that recently there has been a shift from the 
predominant ‘economic subsistence narrative’ on migrants to the so-called narrative of 
‘status-politics’. While the first narrative represents migrants as a group preoccupied 
with economic struggle (Wang, 2009: 121-125), the second one represents migrants as a 
rights-bereft and passive group struggling for social rights associated with the hukou 
system (ibid: 125-127). He believes that both narratives are missing some important 
points.  
Firstly, academics who incorporate both of these narratives do not try to inquire 
into what it is that migrants really want or who they feel they are. Wang argues that 
describing migrants in terms of their need for survival and the economic criteria 
obscures other needs and behaviours, those clustered around their cultural, political and 
social needs (Wang, 2009: 123-124).  
Secondly, both narratives do not allow for space to see migrants as people who 
cross the boundary between them and the city-dwellers through overlapping identities, 
other than those ascribed to them as a group. For instance, migrants form solidarities 
with other employees (who might possess urban hukou) when it comes to employment 
rights or with peasants when it comes to property rights (Wang, 2009:136). He puts 
forward a lengthy critique of authors such as Chen Yingfang and Dorothy Solinger, who 
use the ‘status-politics’ narrative, arguing that it restricts the understanding of migrants’ 
citizenship to a single problem of hukou system. Wang argues that the biggest problem 
of migrants’ subsistence in the cities is not the limitations associated with the hukou 
system, but rather the question of accommodation, wealth disparities and the 
discriminating attitudes related to perception of migrants as ‘lacking quality’ (Wang, 
2009:130-131). The difference in the access to citizenship rights, as defined by Solinger, 
has been greatly transformed because of the encroachment of market rules which have 
already deprived urban citizenry of the majority of the privileges associated with the 
urban hukou (Wang, 2009: 132).  
Here, he also problematizes the relationship between the ‘status-politics’ 
narrative (focusing on hukou) and the notion of ‘turning migrants into citizens’ 
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(shiminhua). He argues that the process of shiminhua is treated uncritically in Chinese 
academia, and that it is too often associated with the one-way process of becoming 
included into the group of urban citizenry through acquiring of urban hukou social 
rights and the transformation of peasants’ identities. Basing on Chantal Mouffe’s ‘The 
return of the political’, instead of expecting migrants to transform their identities to fit 
urban categories, Wang postulates the ‘recognition’ of migrants’ needs and identity 
(Wang, 2009: 133). Similarly, instead of appealing to grant citizens with urban hukou 
rights, these very rights should be redrafted so that they can fit all groups (Wang, 2009: 
132). He criticises the current understanding of ‘citizenship’ (shiminquan) as simply 
associated with the status of possessing urban hukou. He finally argues that the 
reconfiguration of relations between migrants and other groups will be achieved through 
change in relations between exclusion and recognition in the present-day understanding 
of migrants and citizenship in China (Wang, 2009: 135). In other words, the inclusion of 
narratives emphasising recognition of migrants’ and rural citizenship identities (instead 
of those which merely focus on economic situation and the struggle for attaining urban 
hukou) has the potential to dissolve the boundary barring migrants from being 
recognised as ‘citizens’. 
Through critique of popular narratives and definitions of migrants’ citizenship in 
China Wang Xiaozhang emphasises the fluidity of intergroup boundaries. Through 
deconstruction of the understanding of both shiminquan (urban citizenship) and 
shiminhua (being turned into citizen) he exposes that the meaning of citizenship can be 
understood alternatively – as based on relationship between exclusion and recognition, 
rather than on rights. By liberating the notion of citizenship (shiminquan and shiminhua) 
from its equation with the rights of urban hukou, or with being an urban dweller, he 
establishes that the understanding of citizenship in China does not have to retain its 
orientalised sense.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have illustrated how the inheritance of orientalised understanding 
of citizenship has been present in the Chinese academia not just in the form of 
essentialised categories of East and West, but also in the understanding of ‘citizen’ as 
necessarily modern and urban.  This is so because such understanding of citizenship 
stems from ‘internal orientalisation’ of migrants, which re-enacts the modernist 
meaning of ‘citizen’ solidified in Weber’s theory. I have argued that in the case of 
Chinese scholarship on internal migrants, the influence of orientalism is not necessarily 
challenged when ‘Western’ concepts are replaced with Chinese ones. Breaking away 
from the discourse of orientalism is rather seated in the academic attempts to overcome 
alienation of migrants as a group through re-representations of migrants as citizens and 
by questioning existing definitions of who is a citizen in China.  It is through attempts to 
understand migrants not as a uniform group of ‘peasant workers in need of  being turned 
into (urban) citizens’, but by emphasising the subjective character of group boundaries 
and by appealing for recognition of urban and migrant identities instead, that the 
transformation of migrants from Other into Self can be achieved. I argue that this kind 
of resistance to the dominant understanding of migrants as peasants-non-citizens rather 
than the search for non-Western ideas of citizenship in China opens spaces for 
citizenship ‘after orientalism’. 
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1. While referring to Western European and American scholarship and philosophical foundations 
as ‘Western’ throughout this article might be viewed as a reproduction of orientalist categories, 
I find it necessary for the cohesion of the argument and to relate to literature on orientalism 
which uses these notions extensively. Throughout the paper I rather intend to demonstrate how 
the essentialised usage of these concepts hinders development of scholarship ‘after orientalism’.  
2. There is also a separate term for ‘citizenship’, as in ‘passport holding’ of (国籍 guoji), which I 
do not include into the discussion. 
3. The criticism of such widespread and uncritical usage of ‘Western’ methods and concepts in 
Chinese academia was raised by Peng Xingting (2007: 67). His criticism, however, still echoes 
the anti-Western, orientalist and nationalist sentiments. 
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